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IDEAS & ISSUES (MANEUVER WARFARE)
T
he 2018 National Defense 
Strategy identifies the “re-
emergence of long-term, stra-
tegic competition,” a weaken-
ing international order, and rapid and 
more readily accessible technological ad-
vancements as key characteristics of the 
strategic environment that have served 
to undermine U.S. military advantage, 
which the strategy claims can no lon-
ger be taken for granted. The strategy 
serves as a clarion call to awaken the 
DOD from “a period of strategy atro-
phy” and reset the force after almost 
two decades of armed conflict. Reen-
ergizing PME and revising antiquated 
manpower management practices are 
crucial to developing leaders who can 
operate effectively in today’s “increas-
ingly complex global security environ-
ment.”2
Multiple developments since the re-
lease of the 2018 National Defense Strat-
egy provide reasons for optimism that we 
are progressing beyond an industrial era 
mindset to prepare for great power com-
petition. For example, the Department 
of the Navy has emphasized the impor-
tance of agility, education, intellectual 
preparedness, and talent management to 
our warfighting capabilities.3 Similarly, 
Gen David H. Berger’s Commandant’s 
Planning Guidance (CPG) identifies 
the need to fundamentally change the 
manner in which we train, educate, and 
manage the talent of the force, and the 
recently released MCDP 7, Learning, 
formalizes continuous learning as an 
institutional priority. The CPG even 
references the original FMFM 1, War- 
fighting, possibly indicating a broader 
re-embrace of the maneuver tradition.
However, despite these positive de-
velopments, there are some reasons for 
pessimism, too. For one, change in an 
organization is always difficult. Mili-
tary organizations, in particular, have 
been accused of ignoring or misusing 
the past,4 or even rejecting it outright, 
in order to avoid change.5 To adapt and 
learn, organizations must maintain a 
balance between “the exploration of new 
possibilities and the exploitation of old 
certainties.”6 Unfortunately, exploration 
and exploitation compete over scarce 
resources, and in today’s tight budgetary 
environment, which lacks additional re-
sources to serve as a buffer, exploitation 
tends to crowd out exploration since 
feedback from exploitation in the short-
term is greater, more immediate, and 
more observable.7 Manpower policies 
that necessitate short tours only exac-
erbate this desire for short-term impact, 
control, and quantifiable metrics, result-
ing in an inherent bias toward training 
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“We cannot assume that today’s equipment, the way 
that we’re organized, how we train, how we select 
leaders, all of our warfighting concepts, we cannot 
assume that they will remain relevant in the future. In 
fact, my assumption, my premise is they will not. This 
requires, I believe, unshackling ourselves from previ-
ous notions of what war looks like and reimagining 
how Marines will train, how we will operate, how we 
will fight.” 1
—Gen David H. Berger 
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Marines only for the specific tasks they 
need to perform today instead of educat-
ing them for the decades to come. 
Fortunately, organizational change 
and innovation are not new to the Ma-
rine Corps. We wish to share some of 
Col Mike Wyly’s experiences concern-
ing education, thinking, organization, 
and technology that can perhaps help 
the Marine Corps experience a richer 
and more authentic re-embrace of its 
maneuver tradition and avoid being led 
astray by the allure of quick fixes and 
the temptation to cut corners. We write 
this in a spirit of admiration for the 
maneuver warfare movement and its 
influence (if mostly temporary) on our 
Corps and with the belief the maneuver 
philosophy and the reform movement in 
which it was embedded are quite fitting 
for our times.8
Potential Pitfalls
On the heels of the Vietnam War, 
the United States faced a great power 
competition with the Soviet Union, the 
terrorist threat was burgeoning, infla-
tion was ravaging the economy, and the 
military had to resolve the challenges 
posed by the All-Volunteer Force. Viet-
nam required an enormous manpower 
commitment over a long period time, 
cost the Corps over 100,000 killed and 
wounded, delayed modernization pro-
grams essential to the Corps’ amphibi-
ous capability, sparked heated internal 
debate concerning the Corps’ mission 
and standards, and led to unprecedent-
ed, reform-minded public criticism.9
Unfortunately, while many Marines 
experienced the limitations of Marine 
Corps doctrine and centralized decision 
making firsthand and adapted, many at 
Headquarters wanted to put Vietnam 
behind them, forget any lessons learned, 
and revert to the “tried and true,” pre-
Vietnam concepts of conventional war-
fare. In the face of war with the Soviets, 
Col Wyly found this reversion to old 
ideas unacceptable.
Today, the Corps faces a similar 
crossroads, once again trying to mod-
ernize as it enters another great power 
competition following an even longer 
period of combat. Iran and its terrorist 
proxies remain a destabilizing influence, 
the novel coronavirus has disrupted 
the economy, the Corps is integrat-
ing female Marines into combat roles 
previously closed to them, and debate 
over the future Corps continues to be 
waged.10 We do not intend to suggest 
a perfect parallel or to provide prescrip-
tive solutions. Rather, we highlight a 
few potential pitfalls and provide some 
insights for how the Corps overcame 
them in a similarly challenging and 
transformative period in our history. 
Dilemmas of education. There is a 
tendency to talk about education and 
learning in ways that are not really 
conducive to thinking and judgment. 
For example, requirements for school-
houses to produce a certain number of 
graduates each year can emphasize the 
short-term at the expense of long-term 
development.11 This focus on metrics 
strengthens the institution’s desire to 
control, which can undermine feelings 
of ownership instructors have for their 
curriculum, the flexibility they have to 
adapt it to the needs of their students 
and the enthusiasm of the students. Col 
Wyly’s experiences teaching highlight 
the importance of empowering instruc-
tors and developing military judgment. 
After an initial tour as a platoon 
leader in Okinawa, Col Wyly checked 
into 1st MarDiv and was assigned to the 
Counterguerrilla/Counterinsurgency 
(CG/CI) School, where he grappled 
with preparing students for how to 
think in combat. The school was the 
brainchild of LtGen Victor “Brute” 
Krulak, then CG, Fleet Marine Forces 
Pacific. It was Krulak’s idea not only to 
establish it but also to grant instruc-
tors the freedom to exercise initiative 
based on the study of real war as it was 
emerging in the 1960s. Krulak provided 
guidance for how time should be di-
vided between the classroom and field 
work, and he set the criteria for selecting 
instructors. However, he empowered 
the junior officers and NCOs on staff 
to take ownership of the education and 
training experience.12
The focus then was counterinsur-
gency because the Soviet Union planned 
to expand its influence by fomenting 
insurgencies worldwide. As a result, the 
staff became experts on the threat of 
communism and studied every coun-
terinsurgency possible, including in 
Burma, Algeria, Nicaragua, Cuba, the 
Philippines, and South Africa. They 
hosted visitors from the French Foreign 
Legion, Royal Marines, the Republic 
of Vietnam, and Indonesia, and they 
traveled to schools and courses on psy-
chological operations and counterinsur-
gency such as those taught at the John 
F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and 
School to inform and refine their cur-
ricula. They were able to do so because 
Today, the Marine Corps’ culture of learning strives to develop Marines’ critical thinking and 
decision-making skills. (Photo by Cpl Laura Mercado.)
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Krulak freed them from bureaucratic 
hindrances, and they were thus able 
to develop the course as they saw fit, 
making it more tailored and relevant 
to their students.
In designing the two courses at the 
school—one primarily in the classroom 
(but incorporating some field work as 
well) for officers and SNCOs, the sec-
ond a company course in Cleveland Na-
tional Forest—Col Wyly found it coun-
terproductive to offer “school solutions” 
at the end of problem-solving exercises. 
Such solutions were simply somebody 
else’s idea of how to resolve a tactical 
situation the student may never encoun-
ter. Col Wyly and the staff viewed their 
task as making the students think, not 
telling them what to think. In doing 
so, they remained open to the students’ 
ideas, knowing they might well be bet-
ter than theirs. The staff motivated the 
students by injecting a healthy dose of 
realism. The company course, for ex-
ample, culminated in a week-long ex-
ercise against aggressors played by the 
staff. The staff challenged the students 
with tactical problems, enabled them to 
experiment with new ideas while search-
ing for their own solutions, and forced 
them to make decisions—even at the 
lowest levels.13
After two tours in Vietnam with 
1st MarDiv, Wyly attended Amphibi-
ous Warfare School (AWS) in 1973. 
The curriculum relied on lectures and 
scripted tactical problems with school-
house solutions.14 This left Wyly ask-
ing, “How do they know? And, what 
does it matter anyway when the likeli-
hood of being confronted in real com-
bat with the same scenario was slim to 
non-existent?” Rejecting this approach 
to education, Wyly embarked on a quest 
of self-study, spending most nights at 
Quantico’s library reading military 
history. He did not focus on any one 
war or period in history but rather read 
about everything from Genghis Khan 
to Napoleon to Patton and Holland 
Smith. This experience reinforced his 
belief that a school’s mission was to 
teach students how to think and not 
what to think. In all the battles, Wyly 
identified a recurring theme: finding 
the enemy’s weakness and exploiting 
it—decisively.
Wyly’s interest in military his-
tory grew stronger when he attended 
the Command and Staff College in 
1976–1977. Following a WESTPAC 
tour, he was assigned to Quantico’s 
Education Center and began attend-
ing a graduate program at George 
Washington University at night. Then 
MajGen Bernard Trainor, Director of 
the Education Center, took an inter-
est in Wyly’s war studies and named 
him Head of Tactics at AWS in 1979. 
Wyly quickly realized the curriculum 
had not changed since he was a student, 
and much of the doctrine was precisely 
what he had been taught at The Basic 
School in 1962–1963. Empowered by 
Trainor to do it his way and not fall back 
on doctrine, Wyly completely rewrote 
the curriculum, focusing on making 
decisions, broad reading, and nurturing 
questioning minds through active learn-
ing approaches, including historical case 
studies, sand table and map exercises, 
tactical decision games, terrain walks, 
and tactical exercises without troops. 
These active learning approaches are 
based on the premise that there is a stark 
difference between a “manual” that 
functions as a “how to” rule book and a 
“story” relating facts and circumstances 
that enables readers to place themselves 
in the minds of the story’s protagonists 
and relate the protagonists’ decisions 
and actions to the decisions and actions 
they might be called upon to make in 
the future. Much in line with case-based 
and discussion-based approaches to 
teaching in general, Wyly never rejected 
a student’s solution because it might 
not match the school’s—even if it was 
drawn from history. Instead, he asked 
the student why he made the decision 
he did. For students, Wyly believes there 
is little more rewarding than watch-
ing a teacher whom he respects listen 
to him, think over what he said, and 
congratulate him on the quality of the 
idea and the progress he is making. 
Technologitis. Our focus (sometimes 
even fixation) on technology is nothing 
new, and neither are technology’s limita-
tions. However, we tend to overlook the 
latter to justify the former. Gen Berger 
attributes this capabilities-based mind-
set to the end of the Cold War and the 
corresponding lack of a threat against 
whom to base our analysis.15 Technol-
ogy has always offered the promise of 
new, seemingly more effective ways of 
fighting and shortcuts to get there, but 
we cannot know what these new ways 
are without a rigorous and systematic 
trial-and-error process. Unfortunately, 
this process is oftentimes short-circuit-
ed, and military organizations tend 
to engage in “peripheral borrowing,” 
wherein the potentialities and efficient 
use of new technologies are not fully 
realized, as evidenced by the way the 
French in 1940 treated tanks as accou-
trements rather than as an integral part 
of a coordinated military effort.16
Our ability to fight without becom-
ing over reliant on technology is increas-
ingly relevant given the potential for our 
adversaries to disrupt our communica-
tions and the need for smaller units of 
Marines to operate independently. Col 
Wyly understood that leaders need to 
be prepared to think critically and make 
decisions quickly in such an environ-
ment.17 As such, he took a decidedly 
“people first” approach, prioritizing 
investments in our Marines. For ex-
ample, when Wyly first took over at 
AWS, reading assignments consisted 
of excerpts from khaki colored manu-
als that established rules so thinking 
was not required. Upon this realization, 
Wyly went to LtGen Trainor’s office and 
argued that when people go to college, 
the first thing they have to do is buy 
books, so the captains at AWS should 
have to buy (and read) books as well. 
The initial reading list consisted of B.H. 
Liddell Hart’s Strategy; Robert Heinl’s 
Victory at High Tide; Edgar O’Ballance’s 
No Victor, No Vanquished on the Yom 
Kippur War; and Jeter Isely and Philip 
Crowl’s The U.S. Marines and Amphibi-
ous War.18 Reading history, however, 
was not an end in itself. Rather, it was 
Our ability to fight with-
out becoming over re-
liant on technology is 
increasingly relevant ...
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intended to provide vicarious learning 
experiences that enabled Marines more 
readily to recognize patterns and iden-
tify solutions to problems they encoun-
tered on the battlefield. This is necessary 
to enable the effective use of technology.
Under Wyly’s tutelage, the captains 
transformed into avid readers. One of 
these captains, Bill Woods, executed 
orders to 2nd MarDiv as Gen Al Gray 
assumed command. Gen Gray had him-
self already adopted maneuver practice 
and thinking and knew Col John Boyd 
and his “Patterns of Conflict” lecture. 
Woods introduced himself to Gray in 
the Officers’ Club at Camp Lejeune and 
discussed with him what was happening 
at Quantico. Recognizing the impor-
tance of organizational experimentation 
and the need to nurture ideas, Gray es-
tablished the 2nd Marine Division Ma-
neuver Warfare Board, which consisted 
of Woods and other mostly junior offi-
cers, and declared maneuver warfare the 
official doctrine (and way of thinking) 
for the division. Wyly also arranged for 
Gray to become a regular guest speaker 
at AWS. These (and other) activities 
helped maneuver thinking take hold in 
the organization. It was no longer just 
a “new concept” but rather a prelude to 
what many graduates would experience 
on assignment to the FMF. 
Organizational Myopias. If think-
ing and learning are the foundations 
for individual agility, experimentation 
and learning from failures are essen-
tial for organizational agility. Free play 
and force-on-force exercises in realistic 
training environments are most con-
ducive to this type of discovery and 
help us avoid simply training to meet 
minimum requirements (e.g., mission 
essential tasks). Similarly, open inquiry, 
enthusiastic debate, and a willingness to 
hear the viewpoints of others, including 
outsiders, is critical for avoiding com-
placency and falling into a “competence 
trap.”19 This is especially important 
today given the rate of technological 
change. 
While at AWS, Col Wyly invited Bill 
Lind, a congressional aide to Senator 
Gary Hart, down to Quantico to speak 
with the captains, some of whom won-
dered why they had to listen to a “ci-
vilian hack.” Wyly, however, was open 
to ideas from everyone. Lind was well-
educated, even if an outsider, and Wyly 
wanted his captains to hear every side 
of the maneuver warfare debate. When 
the subject of Lind having no experience 
came up, Lind gave Col Boyd’s tele-
phone number to Wyly. Wyly quickly 
formed a friendship with Boyd, another 
outsider, that endured. They compared 
their experiences (Wyly on the ground, 
Boyd in the air), thus forming concep-
tual comparisons that were instructive 
for Wyly’s students. 
Col Wyly also established a relation-
ship with Col John Greenwood, the edi-
tor of the Gazette for 20 years, to use 
the medium to facilitate open inquiry 
and debate without fear of reprisal. Cap-
tains at AWS began meeting at each 
other’s houses on Friday night to reflect, 
debate, and then write articles as they 
sharpened their ideas. This learning 
process was continuous; maneuverists 
never rested on their laurels, recognizing 
that strategy, organizational adaptation, 
and evolution are an ongoing process. 
For example, even as Gen Gray signed 
FMFM 1 and maneuver thinking of-
ficially became the organization’s way 
of thinking, maneuverists were already 
thinking ahead to how to make the 
movement broader and more endur-
ing, refining their ideas along the way 
through an ongoing learning process. 
After all, no victory is permanent but, 
rather, must be won again and again. 
Re-maneuverizing the Marine Corps: 
Lessons From the Past to Inform the 
Future 
Education and the ability to think 
critically, quickly, and decisively are 
critical warfighting enablers. While 
maybe not as intuitively obvious as 
the physical demands, Williamson 
Murray argues the military profession 
might also be the most intellectually 
demanding since military forces rarely 
get the chance to practice their pro-
fession.21 FMFM 1 similarly observes 
the centrality of the human dimension 
in war, reminding us, “No degree of 
technological development or scientific 
calculation will overcome the human 
dimension in war.”22 Recent rhetoric, 
strategic documents, and initiatives in 
the Marine Corps, the Department of 
the Navy, and DOD seem to embrace 
the need to move beyond our industrial 
era mindset. However, any change in an 
organization is fraught with challenges 
“Everything starts and 
ends with the individu-
al Marine.”
—Gen Berger 20
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many wanted to put the Vietnam experience behind them 
and revert to concepts of conventional warfare. (Photo courtesy of the Marine Corps History Division.)
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and oftentimes succumbs to the well-
intentioned bureaucratic tendency to 
develop processes to track, measure, and 
validate “progress” towards an objec-
tive, which usually only serves to stifl e 
it. In highlighting the importance of a 
bottom-up approach starting and end-
ing with the individual Marine, Col 
Wyly’s experiences hopefully might 
inform these efforts. 
 As a teacher, Col Wyly was empow-
ered by senior leaders who trusted him 
and removed bureaucratic obstacles in-
stead of adding to them. This is not to 
say there was no resistance along the 
way. Rather, support from leaders like 
Trainor and Gray enabled Wyly to con-
tinue on despite pressures to revert to 
the old “tried and true” teaching meth-
ods and tactics. Realism and practicing 
decision making, implemented through 
active learning techniques, took prece-
dence over accreditations, quotas, and 
degrees. Instead of relying on mundane 
lectures, Wyly took ownership of his 
curricula, and his enthusiasm proved 
infectious. He inspired (and prepared) 
his students for a lifetime of learning not 
to meet requirements but to live up to 
their professional calling. Col Wyly and 
likeminded maneuverists were always 
seeking to improve, even if this meant 
having the humility to take inputs from 
nontraditional (even eccentric) sources 
and from those they outranked. Perhaps 
most importantly, they placed their re-
sponsibility as professionals ahead of 
their own professional advancement. 
Adapting and overcoming is never easy, 
but we have a rich history that might 
help guide us. 
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Join Us in Developing 
The WWII Iwo Jima Memorial Park 
in Williamsburg, Virginia
Please visit our website at www.iwojimawilliamsburg.com
or email us at info@iwojimawilliamsburg.com. 
Or donate to our 501(c)(3) charitable fund by check.  
Please make checks payable to:    
Iwo Jima Memorial Park Society
1620 Jamestown Road
Williamsburg, VA 23185
Donation receipts will be issued in compliance with 501(c)(3) rules.  
Thank you for your interest and support. 
Our Williamsburg Iwo Jima Memorial will be similar to the iconic
Felix de Weldon statue located in Arlington, Virginia, and will be constructed on 
4 acres of privately-donated land on a scenic hill overlooking Jamestown Road. 
The proposed park will honor all the Marines, Sailors, Soldiers, and Airmen who 
fought gallantly at the Battle of Iwo Jima and sits inside the Historic Triangle of 
Virginia (Colonial Williamsburg, Jamestown, Yorktown) which annually has nearly 
4 million visitors.
Your donation will play an active role in the development of this 
special Iwo Jima memorial. We have an approved site plan and are 




Iwo Jima Memorial 
Park Society
(757) 784-5617
